Abstract: Employing the new regression tests for Convergence, Club Convergence and Clustering proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007), this paper models and analyzes the behavior of China's energy sectors. Energy market ‗convergence clusters' are identified using new price data and their regional spatial distributions are mapped for four major fuel types; coal, gasoline, diesel and electricity. It is found that: i) as yet, there are no fully integrated national energy markets in China as more than one convergence cluster is identified for all four fuels; ii) some regional energy markets can be regarded as ‗quite mature' as evidenced by the existence of some highly concentrated convergence clusters connected geographically; iii) some regional markets remain in a ‗state of transition' as witnessed by convergence clusters that are scattered geographically and growing in membership; vi) it seems that there is more regional-based integration for coal and electricity than for gasoline and diesel as more convergent clusters were identified for coal and electricity than for gasoline and diesel v) Overall, China still appears to be in the process of energy market integration as demonstrated by the number and evolution of convergence clusters over time.
Introduction
China is the world's most populous and largest developing, transition economy, and assessments of its market performance have been mixed. On the one hand, China has been praised for promoting market competition among the state-owned, collective and private sectors (Qian and Xu, 1993) . As a result, many authors studying China's market economy have concluded that some of China's markets are integrated. However, some recent articles argue that changing patterns of provincial economic structure suggest that China's markets have become less rather than more nationally integrated during much of the reform period. Some conclude that the effects of reforms have been to create a number of ‗regional convergence clubs' rather than one single national market. For example, Weeks and Yao (2003) found that there was system-wide income divergence during the reform period (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) as witnessed by the fact that the coastal provinces do not share a common initial technology progress rate with the interior provinces. Young (2000) argues that China's economic reform has actually led to the fragmentation of domestic markets. Poncet (2005) measured China's domestic market disintegration and identified its determinants and she concluded that China is a fragmented economy. Demurger et al. (2002) states that this is not surprising given the substantial differences in regional, location-specific advantages and central government preferential policy, which have resulted in economic development disintegration in China. Maasoumi and Wang (2008) also investigate further evidence of regional economic reforms, economic growth and economic development convergence using a metric entropy-based measure. Their results show that there exist many small economic development convergence clubs in both the pre-and post-reform periods for China.
Based on the above discussions, it might be reasonable to expect that China is not yet a completely integrated market economy, and that it is still effectively in a state of transition. The final outcome may be the formation of powerful, geographically disconnected (or partially connected) regional growth zones. However, rejection of convergence for the country as a whole does not imply there is no evidence of convergence within regional subgroups. Ma and Oxley (2010) who investigated the convergence of major energy fuel price series using traditional unit root and panel cointegration methods. They found that energy price series are not convergent as a whole and regional energy price series display a differing convergent pattern, implying that there might be some regional energy markets in China.
The study presented here uses the new and more powerful methods of Phillips and Sul (2007) to investigate the existence of regional convergence clubs and crucially the transitional dynamics of their formation. The new econometric tests are applied to China's four major fuel price series, coal, electricity, gasoline and diesel, using a unique, high frequency dataset.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces China's major energy reforms to provide the historical background necessary to enable sensible interpretation of the results of the tests. Although econometrically powerful, the testing approach of Phillips and Sul (2007) is atheoretical in that it requires no prior, specific inputs or assumptions on potential, regional, convergence club locations or associations. Section 3 outlines the testing approach and how it is applied to the data, which are also discussed in this section. Section 4 presents the empirical results and discussion. The final section presents some conclusions and possible policy implications.
China's major energy sector reforms
China's energy reforms have recently been extensively documented and discussed (see Ma et al. 2009 ). Here we simply describe some of the major energy reforms in China, which have apparently led to significant changes in behavior to demonstrate the effects of the gradual reform process. Within the period of analysis, there were four major energy reforms of fuel price changes (see Figure 1 ). These major energy Firstly, as more coal entered the ‗free' market, the controlled low price of ‗in-plan' coal was difficult to sustain. Consequently, coal prices were gradually relaxed and for the first time in 1997-intense bargaining between coal companies and power plants was introduced (Hang and Tu, 2007) . This led to a sharp increase in the price of coal from March 1997. Meanwhile, to simplify the control of prices, a new scheme, ‗operation-period price' and ‗yardstick price', was adopted for electricity pricing in 1997. The price under this scheme was based on an average social generation cost and a unified internal rate of return on capital over the remaining Finding evidence of regional convergence clusters, i.e., regions where the ‗Law of One Price' holds for a commodity or group of commodities could occur for one of two reasons. Firstly, the free actions of markets may lead to the removal of arbitrage opportunities as in the traditional convergence story. Clusters may be ‗regional' rather than a single ‗national' market where all prices are the same independent of location, because of the real-world existence of significant transactions costs, which the traditional theory of the -Law‖ assumes are zero. An alternative explanation of regional convergence clusters is that the Central government control of prices process has either explicitly or ‗by accident' created such price convergence, as a consequence of the control process itself.
Method and data

Method
Phillips and Sul (2007) This new approach is highly appropriate for investigation of the potential to identify whether China has energy market convergence clubs given the gradual economic reform characteristics discussed in Section 2.
Data
The dataset comprises a panel of 10-day prices for four energy products in 35 major Unlike other market price data, the fuel price data have no missing observations during the study period as fuels are extensively used in all cities. We use four major fuel products; coal, electricity, gasoline and diesel. These panel data are truly nationally representative as they cover the main fuel components, all provincial capital cities of mainland China, and the period, January 1995 to December 2005. This is to be contrasted with most other empirical studies, which use a price index of lower frequency (typically annual) data. The 10-day frequency of the data also corresponds well to the time required for domestic price arbitrage as lower frequency (monthly) price data are less likely to show any rapid arbitrage when we wish to test for price convergence with any degree of precision (Taylor, 2001 ).
The quality of Chinese data is often criticised as reporting in China is often affected by political factors (Rawski, 2001 ). However, we believe that the data for specific product prices collected by local government agencies under strict government mandates are unlikely to be subject to manipulation. Central government requires the collection of prices for specific products at fixed dates and locations and these price data are also available to the public so that local officials would find it hard to report false data. Unlike macro-economic data (such as GDP growth and employment rates), these micro data for prices could hardly serve as indicators when assessing the performance of local officials and hence local officials have little incentive to falsify them.
macroeconomic management. According to state law, the local price bureaus in 31 major cities are obligated to report price information for a specified list of products to the Price Information Center. The price information must be collected from fixed local markets. The fuel price information is collected three times a month, on the 5 th , the 15 th and the 25 th day of the month. The fuel names are uniform across all cities, and all prices must be market prices.
Results and analyses
Following Phillips and Sul (2007), we empirically model China's energy markets and analyze the transition behavior by identifying convergence clusters and map their geographic distribution.
Identifying Convergent clusters
The convergence clusters identified are listed in Tables 1, 2 Secondly, there were fewer convergence clusters during the first (controlled) sub-period (1995) (1996) than during the other three sub-periods except for electricity.
For example, there were two convergence clusters for coal market during the first sub-period (Table 1) , while there was only one cluster for gasoline and diesel markets during the same sub-period (Tables 3 and 4) . It should be noted that this situation is probably the result of government energy regulation rather than by the operations of a freer energy market due to liberalization. As can be seen from Figure 1 and previous sections, energy prices were generally regulated by government agencies during this period (1995) (1996) , potentially creating convergence in prices via central control.
Thirdly, as can be seen from Table 2 , there were nine convergence clusters for electricity price series during the first (controlled) sub-period . This is the largest number of separate convergence clusters identified in the analysis and is more than for any other three sub-periods or any other fuel. The reason is unclear, however, it is most likely due to the many new price policies created during the early 1990s.
For example, in 1991, a ‗high-in' and ‗high-out' policy was introduced; in 1993, a ‗new plant-new price' policy was implemented; in the 1990s, ‗Power Construction Fund' and ‗Three Gorge Construction Fund' were imposed (Ma and He, 2008). As a result, electricity tariffs have risen rapidly and apparently vary regionally (Lam, 2004 ).
These policies were stopped when a new price scheme (operation-period price and yardstick price) was adopted in 1997.
Fourthly it seems that more separate convergence clusters have appeared as energy reforms have emerged. A typical case may be seen from the results on the coal price series, for example, there were only two convergence clusters during the first (controlled) sub-period (1995) (1996) , three convergence clusters during the second sub-period (1997-1998), and four convergence clusters during the third sub-period Table 1 ). The same cluster pattern can be found for the electricity price series during the last three sub-periods (Table 2 ). For the gasoline price series, there were also more convergence clusters during the last two sub-periods (3 each) than during the first two sub-periods (1 and 2, respectively, Table 3 ). Only for the diesel price series, does it seem that fewer convergence clusters can be isolated for the effects of the ‗Law of One price'. However, the evidence found here is that there are more convergence clusters identified during the latest sub-period than earlier suggesting that China's energy markets have become somewhat freer of the effects of regulation. This may be particularly true for the coal and electricity markets. For example, during the 1995-1996 period there were more coal mines, both small private and large state-owned, but they were regulated by the government. As a result there might have been less variation in the wholesale price of coal and therefore fewer convergence clusters. However, during the ‗new regime' period, as more coal reserves are found and explored and more market deregulation and decentralization, there might emerge more regional-based coal markets, and therefore there might be an increase in the number of coal price convergence clusters identified during this period.
Likewise, as more coal-burning power plants and more electricity transmission networks are constructed, there might appear to be more regional-based electricity markets, and therefore more electricity convergence clusters will be identified and measured.
The dynamics of convergent clusters
As well as identifying the number and coverage of convergence clusters for each of fuel price series over the various sub-periods, we can also observe the dynamics of moving ‗in and out' of a particular convergence cluster by each city and over three sub-periods. The following interesting observations can be made:
Firstly, though, in general, there were two convergence clusters during both 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 periods, actually, one of convergent clusters has already covered most of cities for coal (Table 1) A similar cluster dynamic can be seen for movements from the second sub-period to the third sub-period. For example, most of the cities stay in Cluster One, while most of cities still remain in Cluster Two. Only a few cities from Cluster Two moved to Cluster One (Hohhot, Changchun, Wuhan, Shijiazhuang, Guangzhou and Haikou) and to Cluster Three (Lanzhou and Urumqi). It will be clearer if we sort Table 1 using column 5. It seems, however, that convergence clusters demonstrate more of a dynamic during the last two sub-periods. Those that used to belong to Cluster One in the third sub-period form into three different clusters: nearly half of (rows 1-5: Beijing, Taiyuan, Chongqing, Dalian and Hohhot) still stay in Cluster One; three (rows 7-9:
Guiyang, Changchun and Wuhan) go to Cluster Two, and three (rows 18-20: Xining, Shijiazhuang and Guangzhou) move to Cluster Three. Similarly, those that used to belong to Cluster Two in the third sub-period are also broken into three convergent clusters: of which 37% (rows 10-16) still stay, 37% (rows 21-27) go to Cluster Three, and 26% (rows 29-33) go to Cluster Four.
Secondly, there appears more dynamic movement for electricity convergence clusters with the majority of cities shifting among the clusters, and as a result, there are rarely cities that stay in successive sub-period clusters. As can be seen from Table   2 , for example, only Jinan and Nanchuang successively remain in three same clusters (One and Two, respectively). There are only three cities (Hefei, Shanghai and Changchun) that stay in the same successive luster (One, Two and Three, respectively). Therefore, it seems there are no strict patterns or rules as to how city markets form convergent clusters and how these convergent clusters decompose into new clusters However, it does seem that there are clearer dynamic convergence patterns that emerge for the second and the third sub-periods if we sort the cities of Table 2 by column 6 first and then columns 5, and 4. For example, some of the cities that used to belong to Cluster One and Three converge to form Cluster One; part of cities that used to belong to Cluster One and Two converge to form Cluster Two; some of the cities that used to belong to Cluster One converge to form Cluster Three; and some of the cities that used to belong to Cluster One, Two and Three converge to form Cluster Three.
Thirdly, the dynamics of gasoline convergent clusters seems to be relatively simple (Table 3 ). All cities stay in the same convergent cluster under the control sub-period (1995) (1996) , then with gradual price decentralization, some cities move 
The geography of convergent clusters
In the next stage, we consider the geographical distribution of convergence clusters to consider whether the atheortic test results make geographic sense. Theoretically, it might be expected that the patterns of convergence clusters should become gradually more concentrated and connected geographically as the energy reforms take effect. This is a testable hypothesis which we can investigate using the clustering analysis of Table 2 ).
Thirdly, there is apparent evidence showing that the convergence clusters evolved ‗rationally', for example, Cluster Two for diesel appeared to be scattered across the country from the far west (Urumqi) to far east (Hangzhou) and from far south (Haikou) to far northeast (Harbin) during the third sub-period (Panel C of Figure 5 , Table 4 ). This may be more evidence of central attempts to control prices than a rational market outcome. However, this cluster evolved to represent groups identified as west to east and concentrated from far east to the center during the latest sub-period (Panel D of Figure 5 ). Firstly, there is no single nationally integrated energy market in China as there exist more than one convergence cluster for all four fuels, especially during the latest sub-period. Secondly, some regional energy markets have become more mature as some convergence clusters have become more highly concentrated and geographically connected. Thirdly, some regional markets still seem to be evolving and developing as the convergence clusters identified remain geographically scattered. Fourthly, it is consistent with the characteristics of the various types of energies tested, that more regional integrated markets exist for coal and electricity than for gasoline and diesel.
Fifthly, the dynamics of convergent clusters is different across energy types. As a consequence, convergence clusters for the electricity market are the most dynamic, while those for the gasoline market are the least dynamic. Finally, China is still in the process of energy market integration as evidenced by the continuing evolution of the number, composition and coverage of the various clusters. 
